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Point 
The role of the Cossacks in the conquest 
and exploitation of the territory of the Kazakh 
steppes and Central Asia was initially decisive. 
Firstly Ural (Yaik) Cossacks and then the 
Siberian Cossacks started the incorporation of 
these territories into the Russian state from the 
middle of the XVI century. In the middle of 
the XVIII century Orenburg Cossack Army is 
formed by the Government of the Russian Empire 
in the north-west of the Kazakh steppes, and in 
1867 Semirechensky Cossack Army is formed in 
Semirechye. By the early 80’s of XIX century the 
whole territory of the Kazakh steppes and Central 
Asia became a part of Russia. Cossacks took an 
active part in the conquest of these territories 
and provided powerful cover of the process 
of their development. The role of Cossacks in 
these processes has recently received increasing 
attention, both by native and foreign researchers. 
Among the recent publications on this subject we 
should mention Glushchenko’s works “Russia in 
Central Asia” (Glushchenko, 2010), G. Nedbay 
“Siberian Cossack Host” (Nedbay, 2001, 2004), 
A.P. Yarkov “Cossacks in Kyrgyzstan” (Yarkov, 
2002), M.J. Abdirov “Kazakhstan Conquest by 
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the Tsarist Russia and struggle for independence 
by the Kazakh people”(Abdirov, 2000), 
D.A. Sapunov “The participation of the Cossacks 
of the Urals and Siberia in joining Central Asia 
to Russia” (Sapunov , 2001), N. Abdurakhimova 
“The colonial system of power in Turkestan” 
(Abdurakhimova, 2002), M. Khodorkovsky 
“Russian steppe frontier” (Khodorkovsky, 2001).
Cossacks did not only play a crucial role 
in the annexation of territories of the Kazakh 
steppes and Central Asia to Russia, but also one 
of the major forces in the colonization of space 
and integration into the economic, political 
and social life of the empire. In addition, the 
Cossacks were guarantors that these lands belong 
to Russia. Underestimation of the role of the 
Cossacks in maintaining control of the steppe 
region (Kazakhstan) and Central Asia and the 
economic development of these areas, typical 
for both central and local authorities, led to 
serious consequences in the early XX century. 
In particular, due to the underestimation of the 
fundamental role of the Cossacks in the region 
there was the “Kyrgyz rebellion” in 1916.
Example
Initially the government admitted the crucial 
role of the Cossacks in the conquest, control 
and development of the Kazakh steppes and 
Central Asia. Both central and local governments 
supported the Cossacks strongly. Families of 
Siberian Cossacks, peasants and soldiers, who 
were shifted to the Cossack class, were made to 
move in, often with the use of force. It was done 
in order to ensure the consolidation of the newly 
conquered territories of Russia in Central Asia 
and to organize their economic development here 
in the XVIII – XIX centuries. In order to secure 
the region of the Cossacks, the families of settlers 
were provided with money and natural sources 
from the Government and were given large plots 
of arable land. Also, the government allowed all-
comers to settle in the region on condition that 
the settlers would become the Cossacks. The 
authorities paid much attention to ensure the 
land was given to the Cossacks (Dempsey, 2010). 
Stanitsa plots of land were often taken from the 
indigenous population. Thus, in 1867, with the 
establishment of Semirechensky Cossack troops, 
Cossacks seized the best lands, including the best 
arable land and meadows that were given to them 
in favor of the possession of land that the local 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz population used to have. 
Such plots of arable land given to the Cossacks 
were often huge (Central Asia as part of the 
Russian Empire, 2008: 416). Semirechinsky and 
Ural Cossacks had 95.3 and 94.4 acres of land 
per male respectively in the early XX century. 
(History Cossacks Asiatic Russia, 1996: 37 p.).
By 1916, Cossack population in the Kazakh 
steppes and Central Asia was quite numerous 
thanks to governmental measures. Thus, the 
population of Semirechensky Cossacks was 
45 307 people, living in 19 villages and 15 
“Settlements”, Orenburg Cossacks – 533 thousand 
people in 61 village, 446 towns and 533 villages, 
Siberian Cossacks – 172 thousand people in 53 
villages and 118 towns and Ural Cossacks – 166 
thousand people living in 30 villages and 450 
towns (Cossacks Asiatic Russia, 1996: 15 p.).
However, the final entry of the Kazakh steppes 
and Central Asia to Russia, and stabilization, as 
well as the beginnings of large peasant migration 
to the region, has greatly changed the role of 
the Cossacks, and in particular, its place in the 
colonization process. In 1868 a Military Governor 
of Semirechye G.A. Kolpakovsky wrote that 
“A Cossack does not have an opportunity to 
manage a farm in a proper way as from time to 
time he leaves it in favour of military service”. 
(Fomchenko, 1983: 34 – 35pp.) . A Governor-
General of Turkestan K.P. von Kaufman believed 
that the Cossacks are less valuable element of 
colonization rather than peasants, who are able 
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to farm more effectively on much smaller plots 
of land (Sapunov, 2001: 192 p.). Such attitude of 
the major military leaders in the region led to the 
fact that Cossacks no longer continued getting 
the land. Moreover, the Cossacks started having 
bad experience of the land being taken away from 
them. So with the approval of Kaufman in 1870 – 
1880-s, some authorities in Semirechye began to 
return some of the Cossack lands to Kazakhs or 
cities in order to clear the air in the area. Despite 
the fact that the reduction of the Cossack’s lands 
was declared illegal and the local authorities were 
asked to return the Cossacks 213 thousand acres 
of land having been seized from them and handed 
over to the Kazakhs, it was not done. In general, 
Cossack colonization rates fell sharply after 1880 
and before the end of XIX century. (Sapunov, 
2001: 195 p.).
They continued to violate Cossacks’ land 
rights further either in Semirechye, or in the steppe 
regions. So, it is mentioned in the “Explanatory 
Notes” of “Steppe position” in 1891 that in 
Semirechenskaya, Akmola and Semipalatinsk 
oblasts (regions) the land having been previously 
given to the Cossacks for temporary farming and 
pastures, would be confiscated and given back to 
the city if public administration started to exist 
there. (Central Asia in the Russian Empire, 2008: 
416 p.). 
In unfolded heated debate about the place 
of the Cossacks in the colonization process 
in the late XIX – early XX centuries, it was 
called into question not as a military force, but 
as colonization and agricultural one (Bachner, 
2001). G.F. Chirkin, the representative of Main 
Department of Agriculture and Land, who 
visited Semirechye in 1908, wrote that “peasant 
colonization should be placed above the Cossack 
one ...” (Chirkin, 1908: 103 p.).
Indeed, being overloaded with official 
duties and having almost a lifetime military 
service, Cossacks cultivated about 5% of 
their land despite the use of cheap labor of 
Kazakhs and migrants. Thus, in terms of the 
economy, a Cossack settlement was formally 
less effective than the peasant colonization. 
However, a military and police factor, which 
was a key one for the region, was completely 
ignored with such an assessment. Colonization 
of newly annexed territories inhabited with a 
large number of different ethnic and potentially 
hostile population, could not be effectively 
implemented by peasants only.
Over a long period of residence in the Central 
Asia Cossacks did not only manage to adjust to 
the extreme climatic conditions of the region, but 
also learned how to interact with the indigenous 
population and got to know their mentality. Thus, 
almost all the Siberian Cossacks knew Kazakh 
language and adopted some domestic Kazakh 
customs (Krasnov, 1878: 265 – 266 p.).
Cossacks, who had large land holdings, 
used Kazakh poverty extensively as cheap and 
available labor force. In turn, such recruitment to 
the Cossacks was often the only way to survive 
for poor Kazakhs (East of Russia, 2011: 96 p.).
At the beginning of XX century Cossacks 
lived in most of the Kazakh steppe and in 
Semirechye, however, despite the considerable 
number of Cossacks and their families, and their 
share in the population of the region was very 
low. Due to the outbreak of the First World War, 
a large number of Cossacks were called into 
service. Thus, on December 2, 1916 320 officers 
and 13,175 Cossacks of Ural Cossack troops, 
697 officers and 31,623 Cossacks of Orenburg 
Cossack Army, 303 officers and 13,833 Cossacks 
of Siberian troops, 46 officers and 1,296 Cossacks 
of Life Consolidated Guards of Cossack Regiment 
were drafted in to service. Mass mobilization led 
to a sharp reduction of combat-ready Semirechye 
Cossacks in the steppe region, which negatively 
affected the situation in the region and became 
one of the main causes of mass anti-Russian 
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rebellion of the Muslim population in summer 
1916.
According to the Governor-General of 
Turkestan A.N. Kuropatkin, besides insufficient 
numbers of troops in the region, other causes 
of the rebellion were a lack of a strict “definite 
governmental program of the regional 
management”, the removal of the indigenous 
lands for Russian settlers, lack of awareness of 
the mood of the local population to the Russian 
authorities, an active anti-Russian propaganda of 
the Muslim clergy and German agents and abuse 
of the local “native” authorities (Rebellion of 
1916, 1960: 81 – 82 p.).
According to Folbaum, the Military 
General Governor of Semirechenskaya oblast, 
other reasons of the rebellion were a significant 
weakening of the Russian population in the 
region as a result of a large number of the men 
of the Russian population being called up for 
active military service, “while the non- Russian 
men remained in the area” and also the fact that 
Russian population was taken away the arms 
and ammunition for the war (Red Archives, 
1926.: 73 p.).
Contemporaries consider the main reason 
for the rebellion to be the confrontation of 
Russian settlers and the indigenous people 
over the land. It should be noted that the land 
that was given back to the indigenous people 
of the region was definitely the case, however, 
“the return of the land that had previously been 
occupied by the Russian and Ukrainian settlers 
led to its abandonment, as indigenous people 
did not have the skills and desire to cultivate the 
land”, when it was given back to Kazakhs and 
Kirghiz in 1931.
The immediate cause of the rebellion was 
the decree of 25 June 1916, which required 
“during the on-going war in requisition order 
to attract non-ethnic population of the Empire 
at the age of 19 to 43 to work on fortifications 
and military posts in the army, as well as for any 
other necessary for national defense work ...” It is 
supposed to call up for military service 250 000 
people from the steppe regions (provinces) and 
Central Asia (Morrison, 2009).
It should be noted that representatives 
of the indigenous peoples of this region had 
not traditionally served in the Russian Army, 
but because of the acute need in the people the 
government wanted to replace the soldiers in 
the rear works with “non-Russians”. (Moiseyev, 
2002: 513 – 514 p.).
Indigenous rebellion spread over almost all 
the Steppe region and Turkestan. Representatives 
of the major part of the Muslim peoples of the 
region (Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Uighur, 
Dungan and others) took part in the rebellion. 
They were mostly nomadic and predominantly 
rural population of the region, as well as 
working-Muslims. By the end of 1916 the number 
of rebels had reached 50 thousand people (Lund, 
1995: 177 p.).
It should be noted that the administration, 
foreseeing the possibility of anti-Russian 
statements on the basis of recruitment of workers, 
requested military assistance in July 1916 (Red 
Archives, 1926: 71 p.). However, the central 
government did not allocate it, because on the one 
hand, they did not consider the situation in the 
region particularly dangerous, and on the other 
hand, they did not have free military contingents 
in terms of on-going bloody war.
The first disorders occurred in Turkestan 
province in July, 1916. In July, 1916, there were 86 
disorders in the Fergana region, 25 – in Samarkand 
and 20 – in the Syrdarya. Such disturbances of the 
local population took many forms, from simple 
leaving the enterprise to fleeing to the mountains 
or abroad. However, even on this stage there were 
armed attacks on officials, military, police, and 
the Russian-speaking population (Lund, 1995: 
176 p.).
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Residents of the least developed areas were 
particularly active against the Russian people. 
Thus, the center of the rebellion in the Samarkand 
region was Dzhizak, the most backward district. 
On July 13, instigated by religious preachers a 
crowd that consisted of Dzhizak’s dekhan and 
urban inhabitants tore to pieces a district Chief 
Colonel P. Rukin, police inspector P.D. Zotoglov, 
rural municipality, the translator and the two 
police officers who tried to persuade the rebels 
to disperse. Almost all the district (uyezd) joined 
the residents of Dzhizak. The rebels destroyed the 
bridges, railroad tracks, and station and telegraph 
facilities; they killed railway and postal workers, 
Russian settlers and took Russian women with 
children to the mountains (Rebellion of 1916, 
1960: 94; Red Archives, 1933: 62 p.).
In Semirechye the first rebellious act was 
an armed attack on August 3 when Kazakhs in 
Kyzylburgovskoy volost of Vernensky uyezd 
attacked Kazakh representatives of and Russian 
government officials. As a result, one person 
was killed and three wounded (Red Archives, 
1926: 70 p.).
The population of Kyrgyz territory took 
the most active part in the rebellion in 1916. On 
9 August rebellious acts started in Przhevalsky 
uyezd, where simultaneously there were attacks 
in the village Grigorievka (lake Issyk-Kul) and 
villages Stolypin and Belotsarskoe, located in 
the valley of Kechkorki and Dzhumgola Rivers. 
As a result, almost all the male population of 
Belotsarsk was killed and the women carried off 
into captivity.
Later the attacks were carried out on all the 
settlements located at the northern and southern 
shores of Lake Issyk-Kul and along the post 
road from Przhevalsk to Ohotnichy. The rebels 
burned the Russian towns, robbed and killed 
people. Thus, 11 villages and 16 hamlets along 
the south shore of Lake Issyk-Kul, 8 settlements 
on the north bank, and 9 villages and 11 hamlets 
along the highway at Karkar were destroyed. 
Russian population (mainly women, children and 
old people) while trying to flee from the rebels, 
forsook their houses and property and fled into 
large population centers, where the administration 
was able to establish self-defense. Such centers 
were the town Przhevalsk and the villages 
Teploklyuchevskoe and Preobrazhenskoe. 
Russian population of Przewalsky uyezd suffered 
the heaviest losses during the rebellion. About 
two thousand people were killed there.
On 11 –12 August, in Atekinskay and 
Sarybagishevskay volosts of Pishpek uyezd there 
were armed attacks on the stanitsa Samsonievskay 
(Cossack village) and Bystroretskoe, Orel, 
Novorossiyskand other villages located along the 
river Chu near Tokmak. On 13 August, Tokmak 
was besieged by a crowd of five thousand Kyrgyz 
from surrounding volosts. At this point, Turkestan 
authorities feared a complete destruction of the 
Russian population of Semirechye (Red Archives, 
1926: 70 p.).
Turgay region was one of the main centers 
of the rebellion in the steppe region in 1916. 
Amangeldy Imanov and Alibis Dzhangeldin 
formed a detachment of over 20 thousand people 
there. The detachment consisted mainly of the 
nomadic Kazakhs from Tugai, Syrdarya, Akmola 
and Semipalatinsk regions, as well as Kazakh 
workers of local enterprises and cities (Central 
Asia into the Russian Empire, 2008: 290p). The 
rebels fought a partisan warfare in the region 
between Irgiz, Thurgau, and Karabutak. They 
destroyed the post and telegraph station, attacked 
Russian-speaking settlers and military units, 
including the Cossacks ones, that were located in 
the steppe regions. In late October 1916 Imanov’s 
detachment, which had more than 15 thousand 
people, besieged Turgay (Central Asia into the 
Russian Empire, 2008: 290 – 291 p.).
In an effort to reduce the scale of the rebellion, 
the government reduced the quota of Turkestan 
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to 220 thousand workers and excluded some 
categories of indigenous people for mobilization. 
However, it did not bring any significant results 
and they counted on force methods. Cossacks 
were thought to be the most appropriate force.
Even before the rebellion Cossacks had 
actively been involved in the conduct of the 
mobilization of the indigenous population in the 
rear works. Cossack units were attached to the 
district chief, who helped local “non-Russian” 
administration to draw up lists of conscripts. In 
cases of resistance from the local population, the 
Cossacks often used weapons (Red Archives, 
1926: 66 p.).
Foreseeing the impact of the decree on 
conscription of the “non-Russians” to the rear in 
the steppe region and Central Asia, in July 1916 
local authorities placed few military units in the 
key points of the region, in order to suppress 
quickly any possible disturbances. Thus, 
Sokolov, a military governor of Semirechenskaya 
oblast, wrote to Zemsky department manager in 
his telegram in June 25, 1916 that three platoons 
Cossacks had been sent there in order to suppress 
the campaign in the steppes (Red Archives, 
1926: 57 p.).
During the rebellion, these measures played 
an important role. After some of the representatives 
of the Kazakh government were killed in 
mobilization in the steppe regions, Cossack 
detachments were placed in the most problematic 
areas in steppe provinces – “in Chingirlausskay 
volost and aouls 75 Cossacks were quartered..., 
in Kustanai uyezd within Arakaragayskoy volost 
125 Cossacks were quartered..., and within 
Kinaralskoy and Mindilgarinskoy volosts- 125 
Cossacks were quartered”. (Red Archives, 1926: 
60 p.). In addition, groups of Cossacks were posted 
in some counties in the Akmolinskaya region and 
in Bukeyev horde (Astrakhan region – M.T.).
Liberal Kazakh intelligentsia made an 
attempt to officially achieve the withdrawal 
of military units and the Cossacks above all. It 
was stated that “the appearance of the steppe 
Cossack intimidated the civilians in the vast 
area. Kirghizs, (Kazakhs – M.T.) who had quietly 
expected the workers, became agitated: leaving 
all their possessions they migrated to the south”. 
In this regard, “it required immediate measures 
in calming down the population by calling back 
the steppe Cossack units ... (Red Archives, 1926: 
60p.). However, the government wisely chose to 
ignore this request. Subsequent events proved 
this position to be right.
On receipt of information concerning the start 
of armed actions, the Cossacks were immediately 
involved to save the Russian population and to 
fight against rebels. So, by the start of the revolt 
in Semirechenskaya oblast on Karkar there had 
been located a company under the command of 
narynkolskocharynsky captain Kravchenko. 
After the arrival of hundreds of Cossacks from 
Dzharkent to help, the detachment of Cossacks 
and vigilantes began actively to restore the order 
in the Issyk-Kul and Tekes. On 12 – 14 August 
the detachments of Cossacks brought the local 
Russian-speaking population into Przhevalsk, 
which became the center of defense (Red 
Archives, 1926: 72 p.).
In the beginning of the rebellion, 
Semirechenskye corps of Cossack Army were called 
in the service and all non-combatant commands 
were used. Military units were supplemented 
by volunteers from among the residents and 
lower ranks. Sometimes the performances 
could be attacked preemptively. Thus, after 
the action of Kazakhs in Kyzylburgovskoy and 
Semirechenskaya oblasts, Cossack squadron came 
from Assa and within a few days the population 
of municipality was “exemplary punished”. (Red 
Archives, 1926: 70 p.).
However, in other regions the situation was 
much more serious. Thus, Tokmak in Pishpek 
uyezd was besieged by the rebels. To remove the 
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siege from Tokmak and uprising, a detachment of 
podesaula Bakurevicha was sent there, it passed 
Russian settlements of Kasekskoy group and 
moved to Chuiskaya valley to protect Tokmak 
and nearby Russian settlements (Red Archives, 
1926: 67 p.).
To fight the rebels, the areas of the rebellion 
were under martial law. Declaring the mobilization 
of older Cossacks in the Ural, Orenburg, and 
Siberian Semirechye troops, the government was 
able to fill up the available units and build new 
units to suppress the uprising (Central Asia in the 
Russian Empire, 2008: 290 – 291 p.).
Military units, including the Cossacks, 
were sent to the main centers of the uprising – 
Dzharkentskij uyezd of Semirechye, district of 
Naryn, Pishpek and Tokmak. It made possible to 
start the defeat of insurgent groups and to allow 
the civilians to return to their homes. However, 
the rebels, showed stubborn resistance, and in 
October 1916 were forced to withdraw in China 
under the blows of the Russian armed troops (Red 
Archives, 1926: 72 p.).
Widespread rebellion required considerable 
force for its suppression. In particular, to fight 
the rebels in Turgay region under the command 
of Lieutenant General Lavrentiev there were 
involved 18 Cossack squadrons, 11 cavalry 
squadrons, 17 infantry companies, about four 
thousand bayonets and three thousand sabers. 
Irgiz was released by this detachment, the rebels 
were defeated and Turgay was besieged (Abdirov, 
1994: 61; Central Asia in the Russian Empire, 
2008: 290 – 291 p.).
On 13 August in Semirechye in 
Dzhailmyshevskay volost on Ush Coonoor a rebel 
detachment of up to 500 people was dispersed by 
the Cossack detachment led by vernensky district 
chief lieutenant Basilewsky …(Red Archives, 
1926: 70 p.).
One of the main centers of the uprising 
was Dzhizaksky uyezd in Samarkand volost. A 
detachment of government troops under Colonel 
Pyotr Ivanov was sent there to fight the rebels 
(Glushchenko, 2010: 547 – 548 pp.).
Colonel P. Ivanov, a Siberian Cossack, was 
one of the leaders of the rebellion in 1916 that 
is why it is necessary to pay special attention to 
him.
Pavel P. Ivanov was born on July 26, 1869 
in Semipalatinskay oblast and descended from 
the nobility of Siberian Cossacks. In 1888 he 
graduated from the Siberian Omsk Cadet Corps 
and in 1890 he finished the 1st Pavlovsk Military 
School in St. Petersburg. Ivanov began his career 
as a cornet in the 3rd Siberian Cossack regiment 
in Zaisanskiy uyezd on the border with China. 
From 1900 to 1904 he served in the Army cavalry 
unit of the Turkestan Military District, where he 
earned the rank of captain. From 1904 to 1906 
Ivanov served again as a Cossack in the 7th 
Siberian Cossack regiment. From 1906 to 1914 
he served as the district chief of Przewalsky, 
Vernensky and Khojentsky uyezds in the 
Turkestan Military District. There he received a 
rank of lieutenant colonel. With the outbreak of 
World War P.P. Ivanov became an assistant of the 
commander of the 2nd Regiment of the Kuban 
Cossack, who was fighting in the Carpathians. 
There he was given the rank of a colonel and 
appointed as a commander of the 2nd Brigade 
of the Kuban Cossacks. On 16 February, 1916 
P.P. Ivanov became the commander of the 8th 
Regiment of the Siberian Cossack Division.
In the beginning of “Kyrgyz” rebellion, 
Colonel P.P. Ivanov was withdrew from the front 
and was appointed a commandant Verny city, as 
an Assistant of Military Governor of Turkestan, 
Semirechensky vice-governor and commander 
of all forces to suppress the rebellion. He led the 
suppression of the uprising in one of its main 
centers – Dzhizaksky uyezd. In July 1916 Ivanov 
managed to throw the rebels from Dzhizak, 
which was made his operational base. Hence 
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Ivanov made a series of raids aimed at the defeat 
of the rebels in different parts of Turkestan 
province. He acts decisively and firmly and did 
not stop at destructing the rebel villages with 
artillery completely. Captured leaders of the 
rebellion are executed. All this led to a rapid 
suppression of the rebellion and order-restoring 
in the region. After the February Revolution 
Ivanov was dismissed and forced to leave 
Turkistan. In 1917, he commanded a separate 
Siberian Cossack Brigade on the Caucasian 
front. Due to the high authority of the Cossacks, 
in July 16, 1918 Ivanov was elected as ataman 
(Cossack chieftain) of the Siberian Cossack 
troop (Volkov, Egorov, Kuptsov, 2003: 100 – 101 
pp.; Klaving, 2003: 448 – 449 p.).
Because of the acute shortage of forces on the 
spots to suppress the rebellion, the government 
had to bring out some parts and send them to the 
rebel areas. Cossack units were thought to be the 
most suitable for it. Thus, to suppress the rebellion 
in the Semirechye, 7th Orenburg and 9th Siberian 
Cossack regiments with artillery and machine 
gun teams were transferred there from the front 
(Sapargaliyev, 1966: 156 p.).
That time two regiments of Semirechensky 
Cossack troops were sent from the front in 
Semirechye. After the uprising, they were left 
to maintain the order in the region (Leshchev, 
2004: 142 p.).
In late July 1916 the Governor-General of 
Turkestan was appointed one of his immediate 
conquest, a friend and colleague M. Skobelev, 
Alexei Kuropatkin. In his reports to the tsar 
and the minister of war, A.N. Kuropatkin called 
punitive expeditions against the rebels ‘military 
action’, which indicated their scale. According 
to him, to suppress the rebellion there were 
involved 14.5 infantry battalions, 33 hundreds 
(Cossacks), 42 guns and 69 machine guns, and 
military action against the rebels took place in 
different areas from 13 July, 1916 to 25 January, 
1917 (Morrison, in 2009, the 1916 rebellion, 
1960: 97 p.).
The rebellion in 1916 gave the tsarist 
government the idea of increasing the number 
of Cossack in Steppe area and Turkistan and the 
creation of new villages in the lands that had 
been taken from nomads. On 16 October, 1916 on 
the meeting with Turkestan Governor-General, 
the tsarist government decided to create 5 new 
Cossack villages for 60 yards in Semirechye, 
which had been affected the worst by the 
uprising. On 22 February, 1917 A.N. Kuropatkin 
sent a report to the king with a request to approve 
the plans of colonization of the Cossack in the 
Przhevalsky and Naryn uyezds, giving each of 
them 150 thousand acres of land. He particularly 
stated the need for the two villages in the fertile 
land Toguz Toro in order to protect paths in 
Fergana. Orenburg, Siberian and Semirechensk 
Cossacks were suggested to move to these places. 
It was also intended to expand Zanarynsky 
settlement (village Belotsarskaya), and “either to 
make a Cossack post on the Atayka or to offer 
migrants become the Cossacks” (Yarkov, 2002: 
53). February Revolution ended the future plans 
of Cossack colonization. 
The result of the uprising was the destruction 
of Russian villages and hamlets, especially in the 
southern part of Semirechye, where the population 
had been killed by the rebels. Przewalsky and 
southern Dzarkentsky uyezds were particularly 
affected. More than 9,000 farms of Russian 
settlers were destroyed, part of the railway, 
bridges, agricultural schools, several churches 
and hospitals were burned. The total amount of 
private damages was about 10 million rubles, not 
including state-owned loss.
During the uprising, 2325 Russian people 
were killed, 1384 people went missing, that is 
killed or died in captivity. As for the military 
involved in the suppression of the uprising, 79 
soldiers and four officers were killed, 77 private 
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solders went missing and 67 soldiers were 
wounded (Rebellion in 1916, 1960: 549 p).
It’s impossible to establish the number of 
deaths of local residents because a large number of 
rebels and their families went to China and Persia 
and lived there for a long time in the process of 
suppressing the rebellion. In addition, a Muslim 
custom to bury the dead on the day of their death 
should be taken into account.
During the suppression of the uprising about 
300 thousand rebels and their families went to 
China. Having lost all the cattle there, they had 
to go back. Those who came back from Chinese 
were allowed to live in the old place and use their 
former land. However, those, who participated 
in the murder of the Cossacks, their families and 
the Russian settlers, were deprived of their lands, 
which were given to Cossack villages and peasant 
settlements (Moiseyev, 2002: 503 p.).
More than 3 thousand people were detained 
on suspicion of involvement in the riots; however, 
only 933 people were given on trial. 346 people 
were acquitted and 587 were convicted. 201 
people were given a death sentence, but only 20 
convicts were hanged (1916 Rebellion 1960: 74 
p.). It was the lowest number considering the dead 
Russian settlers and the military.
Conclusion
“Kyrgyz” rebellion in 1916 showed the failure 
of estimates of Cossack colonization in the steppe 
regions and Central Asia in the late XIX – early XX 
centuries. Only the economic component of the 
process was taken into account and the military-
police component was completely ignored. As 
a result, in 1870s. Russian government in the 
region began to constrain artificially the Cossack 
colonization up to the seizure of farmland from 
the Cossacks and their transfer to the indigenous 
population. The consequence of this policy was 
a sharp slowdown in the Cossack colonization of 
the region. Incentives of peasant colonization did 
not make it possible to create a serious barrier of 
potential threat of anti-Russian actions. Cossacks, 
who had experience with the indigenous Muslim 
population, were adapted to the difficult climatic 
conditions of the region and combined the features 
of both the peasants and soldiers, were in general 
much more effective element of colonization. As 
a result, in a difficult socio-economic situation 
caused by the protracted course of the First World 
War, the indigenous people of the steppe regions of 
Central Asia raised anti-Russian rebellion. One of 
the main factors that contributed to the beginning 
of the rebellion was a lack of a significant part 
of the male population of the Cossack regions, 
who had been drafted to army. A small number 
of Cossacks and the inability of Russian peasant 
and urban population to confront the rebels 
effectively caused such harsh consequences of 
the rebellion. Despite the difficult environment, 
Cossacks became the main force that ensured the 
location and then the suppression of the uprising. 
Assessing the role of Cossacks on its merits, the 
government took active steps to increase its size in 
the region and to intensify the process of Cossack 
colonization but the process was interrupted by 
the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War.
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Казачество в межэтнических конфликтах  
на территории Центральной Азии в начале XX в.  
«Киргизское» восстание 1916 г. 
Э.Г. Колесник, М.Г. Тарасов
Сибирский федеральный университет 
Россия 660041, Красноярск, Свободный, 79
Статья посвящена истории взаимодействия казачества с коренными мусульманскими 
народами Центральной Азии в начале XX в. Основное внимание в статье уделяется участию 
казаков в подавлении «Киргизского» восстания 1916 г. В работе анализируется роль казаков 
в завоевании и освоении территории Казахстана и Средней Азии в XVI – XIX вв., характер их 
взаимоотношений с местным коренным народами, предпосылки восстания мусульманского 
населения региона в 1916 г. В статье предпринята попытка доказать, что недооценка 
центральными и региональными властями роли казачества в сохранении контроля России над 
территорией Центральной Азии и искусственное сдерживание казачьей колонизации стали 
основными причинами восстания 1916 г. Катастрофические последствия этих действий 
привели к полному пересмотру политики в отношении казачества и попыткам форсировать 
казачью колонизацию региона, которая была прервана революцией 1917 г.
Ключевые слова: казачество, колонизация, межэтнические отношения, этнический конфликт, 
Первая мировая война, Российская империя, Туркестан, мусульманские народы. 
